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Abstract. This paper considers a class of models in which rank-based payoffs are sensitive to
small amounts of noise in decision making. Examples include auction, price-competition,
coordination, and location games. Observed laboratory behavior in these games is often
responsive to asymmetric costs associated with deviations from the Nash equilibrium. These
payoff asymmetry effects are incorporated in an approach that introduces noisy behavior via
probabilistic choice. In equilibrium, behavior is characterized by a probability distribution that
satisfies a "rational expectations" consistency condition: the beliefs that determine player’s
expected payoffs match the decision distributions that arise from applying a logit probabilistic
choice function to those expected payoffs. We prove existence of a unique, symmetric logit
(quantal response) equilibrium and derive comparative statics results. The paper provides a
unified perspective on many recent laboratory studies of games in which Nash equilibrium
predictions are inconsistent with both intuition and experimental evidence.
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I. Introduction
In some contexts, a small amount of randomness can have a large impact on equilibrium
behavior. Regardless of whether randomness, or noise, is due to preference shocks,
experimentation, or actual mistakes in judgement, the effect can be particularly important when
players’ payoffs are sensitive to others’ decisions, e.g. when payoffs are discontinuous as in
auctions, or highly interrelated as in coordination games. Nor does noise cancel out when the
* This research was funded in part by the National Science Foundation (SBR-9617784) and (SBR-9818683).Nash equilibrium is near a boundary of the set of feasible actions and noise pushes actions
towards the interior, as in a Bertrand game in which the Nash equilibrium price equals average
cost. In such games, small amounts of noise in decision making may have a large "snowball"
effect when endogenous interactions are considered.
The Nash equilibrium in these types of games is often insensitive to parameter changes
that most observers would expect to have a large impact on actual behavior. In a minimum-effort
coordination game, for example, a player’s payoff is the minimum of all player’s efforts minus
the cost of the player’s own effort. With simultaneous choices, both intuition and experimental
evidence suggest that coordination on desirable, high-effort outcomes will be harder with more
players and higher effort costs, despite the fact that any common effort level is a Nash
equilibrium (Goeree and Holt, 1999c). Another well known example is the "Bertrand paradox"
that the Nash equilibrium price is equal to marginal cost, regardless of the number of
competitors, even though intuition and experimental evidence suggest otherwise (Dufwenberg and
Gneezy, 1998).
The rationality assumption implicit in the Nash approach is that decisions are determined
by the signs of the payoff differences, not by the magnitudes of the payoff gains or losses. But
the losses for unilateral deviations from a Nash equilibrium are often highly asymmetric. In the
minimum-effort coordination game, for example, a unilateral increase in effort above a common
(Nash) effort level is not very risky if the marginal cost of effort is small, while a unilateral
decrease would reduce the minimum and not save very much in terms of effort cost. Similarly,
an effort increase is relatively more risky when effort costs are high. In each case, deviations
in the less risky direction are more likely, and this is why effort levels observed in laboratory
experiments are inversely related to effort cost, despite the fact that any common effort is a Nash
equilibrium in these games.
Many of the counter-intuitive predictions of a Nash equilibrium disappear when relatively
small amounts of noise are introduced into the decision-making process, which is the approach
taken in this paper. This randomness is modeled using a probabilistic choice function, i.e. the
probability of making a particular decision is a smoothly increasing function of the payoff
associated with that decision. One attractive interpretation of probabilistic choice models is that
the apparent noisiness is due to unobserved shocks in preferences, which cause behavior to
2appear more random when the observed payoffs become approximately equal. Of course,
mistakes and trembles are also possible, and these presumably would also be more likely to have
an effect when payoff differences are small, i.e. when the cost of a mistake is small. In either
case, probabilistic choice rules have the property that the probability of choosing the "best"
decision is not one, and choice probabilities will be close to uniform when the other decisions
are only slightly less attractive.
When a probabilistic choice function is used to analyze the interaction of strategic players,
one has to model beliefs about others’ decisions, since these beliefs determine expected payoffs.
When prior experience with the game is available, beliefs will evolve as people learn. Learning
slows down as observed decisions look more and more like prior beliefs, i.e. as surprises are
reduced. In a steady state, systematic learning ceases when beliefs are consistent with observed
decisions. Following McKelvey and Palfrey (1995), the equilibrium condition used here has the
consistency property that belief probabilities which determine expected payoffs match the choice
probabilities that result from applying a probabilistic choice rule to those expected payoffs.
Perhaps the most commonly used probabilistic choice function in empirical work is the
logit model, in which the probability of choosing a decision is proportional to an exponential
function of its expected payoff. This logit rule exhibits nice theoretical properties, such as having
choice probabilities be unaffected by adding a constant to all payoffs. We have used the logit
equilibrium extensively in a series of applications that include rent-seeking contests, price
competition, bargaining, public goods games, coordination games, first-price auctions, and social
dilemmas with continuous choices.
1 In the process, we noticed that many of the models share
a common auction-like structure with payoff functions that depend on rank, i.e. whether a
player’s decision is higher or lower than another’s. In this paper, we offer general proofs of
theoretical properties based on properties of the expected payoff functions. Section II
summarizes a logit equilibrium model of noisy behavior for interactive games with rank-based
1 In a couple of these applications, the derivation of some theoretical properties are provided, but they rely on the
special structure of the model being studied (Anderson, Goeree, and Holt, 1997b, 1998a,b, Capra, et al., 1999b, and
Goeree, Anderson, and Holt, 1998). In other cases, theoretical results are absent, and the focus is on estimations that are
based on a numerical analysis for the specific parameters of the experiment (Capra et al., 1999a,b; Goeree and Holt,
1999b,c; and Goeree, Holt, and Laury, 1999). In contrast, this paper provides an extensive treatment of the theoretical
properties of logit equilibria in games with rank-based payoffs.
3outcomes. Proofs of existence, uniqueness and comparative statics follow in section III. In
section IV, we apply these results to a variety of models that represent many of the standard
applications of game theory to economics and social science: coordination, social dilemmas,
auctions, public goods, location, price competition, etc. Comparisons with learning theories and
other ways of explaining behavioral anomalies are discussed in section V, and the final section
concludes.
II. An Equilibrium Model of Noisy Behavior in Auction-Like Games
The standard way to motivate a probabilistic choice rule is to specify a utility function
with a stochastic component. If xi denotes decision i with expected payoff p
e(xi), then the person
is assumed to choose the decision i with the highest value of Ui = p
e(xi)+µ e i , where µ is a
positive "error" parameter and ei is the realization of a random variable. When µ = 0, the
decision with the highest expected payoff is selected, but high values of µ imply more noise
relative to payoff maximization. As noted above, this noise can be due to either 1) errors, e.g.
distractions, perception biases, or miscalculations that lead to non-optimal decisions, or 2)
unobserved utility shocks that make rational behavior look noisy to an outside observer.
Regardless of the source, the result is that choice is stochastic, and the distribution of the random
variable determines the form of the choice probabilities. A normal distribution yields the probit
model, while a double exponential distribution gives rise to the logit model, in which case the
choice probabilities are proportional exponential functions of expected payoffs. In particular, the
logit probability of choosing alternative i is proportional to exp(p
e(xi)/µ), where higher values of
the error parameter µ make choice probabilities less sensitive to expected payoffs.
2 With a
continuum of decisions on [− x,
− x], the logit model specifies a choice density that is proportional
to an exponential function of expected payoffs:
2 An alternative justification for use of the logit formula follows from work in mathematical psychology. Luce
(1959) provides an axiomatic derivation of this type of decision rule; he showed that if the ratio of choice probabilities
for any pair of decisions is independent of the payoffs of all other decisions, then the choice probability for decision i
can be expressed as a ratio: ui/Sjuj, where ui is a "scale value" number associated with decision i. If one adds an
assumption that choice probabilities are unaffected by adding a constant to all payoffs, then it can be shown that the scale
values are exponential functions of expected payoffs. Besides having these theoretical properties, the logit rule is
convenient for estimation by providing a parsimonious one-parameter model of noisy behavior that includes perfect
rationality (Nash) as a limiting case.









µ is an "error parameter" that determines how closely densities correspond to expected payoffs.
3
Note that payoff differences do not matter as µ goes to infinity, since the argument of the
exponential function in (1) goes to zero and the density becomes flat (uniform), irrespective of
the payoffs. Conversely, payoff differences are "blown up" as µ goes to zero, and the density
piles up at the optimal decision.
4 Limiting cases are useful for providing intuition, but we will
argue below that it is the intermediate values of µ that are most relevant for explaining data of
human subjects, who are neither perfectly rational nor perfectly noisy. In this case, choice
probabilities are smoothly increasing functions of expected payoffs, so these probabilities will
be affected by asymmetries in the costs of deviating from the payoff-maximizing decision.
In order to apply this model to interactive games, one must deal with the fact that
distributions of other players’ decisions enter the expected payoff function on the right side of
equation (1). A Nash-like consistency condition is that the decision distributions that determine
expected payoffs on the right side of (1) match the decision distributions on the left that result
from probabilistic choice applied to those expected payoffs. Thus the logit choice rule in (1)
determines players’ equilibrium distributions as a fixed point. This is known as a logit
equilibrium, which is a special case of the "quantal response equilibrium" introduced by
McKelvey and Palfrey (1995, 1998).
3 An independent motivation for the equilibrium condition in (1) is provided by Anderson, Goeree, and Holt
(1997a), who postulate a directional-adjustment evolutionary model that yields (1) as a stationary state. The model is
formulated in continuous time with a population of players. The primitive assumption is that each player adjusts the
decision in the direction increasing expected payoff, at a rate that is proportional to the slope of the payoff function, plus
some Brownian motion. Thus if the payoff function is flat, decisions change randomly, but if the payoff function is steep,
then adjustments in an improving direction dominate the noise effect. We show that the stationary states for this process
are logit equilibria. The advantage of a dynamic analysis is that it can be used to consider stability and elimination of
unstable equilibria. Anderson, Goeree, and Holt (1997a) show that the gradient-based directional adjustment process is
globally stable for all potential games, with a Liauponov function that can be interpreted as a weighted combination of
expected potential and entropy.




5Differentiating both sides of (1) with respect to x (and rearranging) yields:
which provides a differential equation in the equilibrium choice density. This density has the
(2) p
e(x) f(x) µ f (x) 0,
same slope as the expected payoff function in equilibrium, so their relative maxima coincide,
although the spread in the density around the payoff-maximizing choice is determined by µ. The
use of (2) to calculate of the equilibrium distribution is illustrated next in the context of an
example that highlights the dramatic effects of adding noise to a standard Nash equilibrium
analysis.
Example 1. Traveler’s Dilemma
The game that has the widest range of applications in the social science literature is the
social dilemma in which the unique Nash equilibrium yields an outcome that is worse for all
players than a non-equilibrium cooperative outcome. Unlike the familiar prisoner’s dilemma
game, the traveler’s dilemma is a social dilemma in which the Nash strategy is not a dominant
strategy. This game describes a situation in which two people lose identical objects and must
make simultaneous loss claims in a pre-specified interval (Basu, 1994). Each player is
reimbursed at a rate that equals the minimum of the two claims, with a fixed penalty amount $R
being transferred from the high claimant to the low claimant if the claims are unequal. This
penalty gives each an incentive to "undercut" the other, and the unique Nash equilibrium is for
both to claim the lowest possible amount, despite the fact that there is little risk of making a high
claim when R is small. The traveler’s dilemma game is important precisely because of this sharp
difference between economic intuition and the unique Nash prediction.
The expected payoff function for the traveler’s dilemma game is:











(x R) fj(y) dy, i, j 1,2, j¹i,
second term corresponds to the case where the reward R is obtained. The derivative of expected
6payoff can be expressed:
The 1 - Fj(x) term picks up the probability that the other claim is higher, i.e. that a unilateral
(4) p
e
i(x) 1 Fj(x) 2 Rf j( x ).
increase will raise the minimum. The final term in (4) is due to the payoff discontinuity at equal
claims: -2R is the payoff reduction involved in "crossing over" the other’s claim, i.e. losing the
R reward and paying the R penalty. This crossover occurs with a probability that is determined
by the density fj(x). In most of the applications considered in section IV below, the marginal
expected payoff function will have terms with distribution functions, reflecting the probabilities
of being higher or lower than the others, and terms involving the densities, reflecting "cross-over"
probabilities when there are payoff discontinuities.
In order to solve for the equilibrium distribution, substitute the expected payoff derivative
(4) into the logit differential equation, which yields a second order differential equation in the
equilibrium F(x). Although no analytical solution exists, this equation can easily be solved
numerically for a given value of µ. The top part of Figure 1 shows the equilibrium densities for
µ = 8.5 (estimated from the data) and penalty/reward parameters of 10, 25, and 50. Notice that
the predictions of this model are very sensitive to changes in R. With R = 50, the density piles
up near the unique Nash prediction of 80 on the left side of the graph, but the density is
concentrated at the opposite side of the set of feasible claims when R = 10. The general pattern
of deviations from the Nash prediction shows up in the bottom part of Figure 1, which shows the
data averages for each treatment, as a function of the period number on the vertical axis (Capra,
et al., 1999a).
The numerical calculations used to construct the upper part of Figure 1 only pertain to
the particular parameters used in the experiment, which raises some interesting theoretical issues:
will a logit equilibrium generally exist for this game and others like it, will the equilibrium be
unique, symmetric, and single-peaked, and will increases in the incentive parameter R always
reduce claim distributions? These theoretical issues were not addressed in the original paper
(Capra et al., 1999a), but are resolved by the propositions that follow.
7Figure 1. The Traveler’s Dilemma.
Key: Predicted Claim Densities (Top) and Actual Claim Averages (Bottom)
for R = 50 (Left), R = 20 (Center), and R = 10 (Right)
Rank-Based Payoffs and the Local Payoff Property
In the traveler’s dilemma example, the payoff function consists of two parts, where each
part is the integral of a payoff function that is relevant for the case of whether the player’s
decision is the higher one or not. This rank-based also arises naturally in other contexts: in price
competition games where the low-priced firm gains more sales, in minimum-effort coordination
games where the common part of the production depends on another’s effort only when it is
lower than one’s own effort, and in location games on a line where the market divides with the
8left part going to the firm with the left-most location. These applications can be handled with
a rank-based expected payoff function that has two parts. First consider two-person games and
let aH(x) and aL(x) be payoff components associated with one’s own decision when it is higher
or lower than the other’s decision. Similarly, let bH(y) and bL(y) be payoff components
associated with the other player’s decision when one’s own rank is high or low. Then the
traveler’s dilemma payoff function in (4) is a special case of:











cases where the payoffs are not dependent on the relative rank, as in the public goods game
discussed below. As long as these two component payoff functions are additively separable and
continuous in own and other’s decision, it is straightforward to verify that the expected payoff
derivative will have the "local" property that it depends on the player’s own decision x and on
the other’s distribution and density functions evaluated at x. In this case, we can express the
expected payoff derivative as: pi
e’(Fj(x), fj(x), x, a), as is the case in equation (4), where the a
notation represents an exogenous shift parameter that corresponds to the penalty parameter in the
traveler’s dilemma.
Equation (5) is easily adapted to the N-player case in which one’s payoff depends on
whether one has the lowest (or highest) decision. If having the highest decision is critical, as in
an auction, then the H and L subscripts represent the case where one’s decision is the highest or
not, respectively, and the density used in the integrals is the maximum of the N-1 other decisions,
i.e. f(y) in (5) is replaced with (N-1)F(y)
N-2f(y). In a second-price auction for a prize with value
V, for example, aH(x)=V , b H ( y )=-y , and aL(x)=b L ( y )= 0. Given the assumed additive
separability of the a and b functions, it is straightforward to verify that (5) (with the density of
the maximum or minimum of the others’ decisions substituted for f(y)) yields an analogous
"local" property for N-player games. In other words, the expected payoff derivative, pi
e’(Fj(x),
fj(x), x, a), depends on the distribution and density functions of all N - 1 other players, j = 1,...,
N, j ¹ i. We will use the term local payoff property for games in which the expected payoff
9derivative is only a function of probability-like terms, i.e. of the other players’ distribution and
density functions, and possibly of x and exogenous parameters.
III. Properties of Equilibrium: Existence, Uniqueness, and Comparative Statics
The expected payoff derivatives for particular games, e.g. (4), can be used together with
the logit differential equation (2) to calculate equilibrium choice distributions for particular values
of the exogenous payoff and error parameters. These calculations are vastly simplified if we
know that there exists a solution that is symmetric across players.
Proposition 1. (Existence) For all games in which players’ expected payoffs are bounded and
continuous in other’s distribution functions, there exists a symmetric logit equilibrium for N-
player games with a continuum of feasible decisions, and the equilibrium distribution is twice
differentiable.
The proof in Appendix A is obtained by applying Schauder’s fixed point theorem to the
mapping in (1); in fact, the proof applies to the more general case where the exponential
functions in (1) are replaced by strictly positive and strictly increasing functions, which allows
other probabilistic choice rules besides the logit/exponential form.
Uniqueness
When the expected payoff derivative satisfies the local-payoff property, the logit
differential equation in (1) is a second-order differential equation with boundary conditions F(− x)
= 0 and F(
− x) = 1. We will show that for many games with rank-based payoffs the symmetric
logit equilibrium is unique. The method of uniqueness proof is by contradiction: we start by
assuming that there exists a second symmetric logit equilibrium, and then show that this is
impossible under the assumed conditions. There are several "directions" in which one can obtain
a contradiction, which explains why there are alternative sets of assumptions for each proposition.
These alternative assumptions will enable us to evaluate uniqueness for an array of diverse
examples in the next section. Parts of the uniqueness proof are included in the text here because
10they are representative of the symmetry and comparative statics proofs that are found in the
appendices. In particular, all of these proofs have graphical "lens" structures, as indicated below.
Proposition 2 (Uniqueness). Any symmetric logit equilibrium for a game satisfying the local
payoff property is unique if the expected marginal payoff, p
e’(F, f, x, a) is either
a) strictly decreasing in x, or
b) strictly increasing in the common distribution function F, or
c) independent of x and strictly decreasing in f, or
d) a polynomial expression in F, with no terms involving f or x.
Proof for Parts (a) and (b). Suppose, in contradiction to the statement of the Proposition, that
there exist (at least) two symmetric logit equilibrium distributions, denoted by F1 and F2.
Without loss of generality, assume F1(x) is lower on some interval, as shown in Figure 2.
Case (a) is based on a horizontal lens proof: Any region of divergence between the
Figure 2. Horizontal Lens Proof: A Configuration that Yields a Contradiction when F2 > F1
distribution functions will have a maximum horizontal difference, as indicated by the horizontal
line in Figure 2 at height F
* = F1(x1)=F 2 ( x 2 ). The first- and second-order conditions for the
distance to be maximized at F
* are that the slopes of the distribution functions be identical at F
*,
11i.e. f1(x1)=f 2( x 2), and that f1´(x1) ³ f2´(x2). In Case (a), p
e’(F, f, x, a) is decreasing in x, and since
the values of the density and distribution functions are equal, it follows that
Then the logit differential equation in (2) implies that f1´(x1)<f 2 ´(x2), which yields the desired
(6) p
e
I (FI(xI), fI(xI), xI, a)<p
e
II (FII(xII), fII(xII), xII, a).
contradiction.
Case (b) is proved with a vertical lens proof: If there are two symmetric distribution
Figure 3. Vertical Lens Proof: A Configuration that Yields a Contradiction when F2 > F1.
functions, then they must have a maximum vertical distance at x
* as shown in Figure 3. The
first-order condition is that the slopes are equal, so the densities are the same at x
*. Under the
assumption (b), p
e’(F, f, x, a) is increasing in F, and it follows from (1) that f1´(x1)<f 2 ´(x2),
which yields the desired contradiction. Q. E. D.
The proof of Proposition 2(c) in Appendix B can be skipped on a first reading since it
involves a transformation-of-variables technique that is not used in any of the other proofs that
follow. Note, however, that Proposition 2(c) implies uniqueness for the traveler’s dilemma
example, since the expected payoff derivative in (4) is independent of x and decreasing in f.
Proposition 2(d), also proved in the appendix, is based on observation that the logit differential
12equation (1) can be integrated directly when the expected payoff derivative is a polynomial in
F, and the resulting expression for the density produces the desired contradiction.
Comparative Statics
It is apparent from (1) that the logit equilibrium density is sensitive to all aspects of the
expected payoff function, i.e. choice propensities are affected by magnitudes of expected payoff
differences, not just by the signs of the differences as in a Nash equilibrium. In particular, the
logit predictions can differ sharply from Nash predictions when the costs of deviations from a
Nash equilibrium are highly asymmetric, and when deviations in the less costly direction make
further deviations in that direction even less risky, creating a kind of "snowball effect." These
asymmetric payoff effects can be accentuated by shifts in parameters that do not alter the Nash
predictions. Since the logit equilibrium is a probability distribution, the comparative statics
effects will be in terms of shifts in distribution functions. Our comparative statics effects pertain
to shifts in the sense of first-degree stochastic dominance, i.e. the distribution of decisions
increases in this sense when the distribution function shifts down for all interior values of x.W e
assume that the expected payoff derivative, p
e’(F, f, x, a), is increasing in a, ceteris paribus.
The next proposition shows that an increase in a raises the logit equilibrium distribution in the
sense of first-degree stochastic dominance. Only monotonicity in a is required, since any
parameter that decreases marginal profit can be rewritten so that marginal profit strictly increases
in the new parameter.
Proposition 3 (Comparative Statics for a Symmetric Equilibrium). Suppose that the shift
parameter increases marginal expected payoffs, i.e. ¶p
e’(F, f, x, a)/¶a > 0, for a symmetric game
satisfying the local payoff property. Then an increase in a yields stochastically higher logit
equilibrium decisions if p
e’(F, f, x, a) is either
a) decreasing in x, or
b) increasing in F.
The proof is provided in Appendix C. Case (a), which is proved with a horizontal lens
argument, is based on a weak concavity property that will be satisfied by all of the games
13considered in this paper. In the traveler’s dilemma game for example, ¶p
e’/¶x is exactly 0, so
case (a) applies. Let a =- R . Since the expected payoff derivative in (4) is decreasing in R,i t
follows that a decrease in R will raise a and hence will raise claims in the sense of first-degree
stochastic dominance, which is consistent with the data in Figure 1. This increase in claims,
however intuitive, is not predicted by standard game theory, since the Nash equilibrium is the
minimum feasible claim as long is R is strictly positive. The logit result is intuitive given that
a reduction in the penalty parameter, R, raises the slope of the expected payoff function and
makes it less risky and less costly to raise one’s claim unilaterally.
Finally, consider the effects of changes in the error parameter µ. Although one would not
normally think of the error parameter as being under the control of the experimenter, it is
apparent from (1) that multiplicative scaling up of all payoffs corresponds to a reduction in the
error parameter, i.e. multiplying expected payoffs by g is equivalent to multiplying µ by 1/g.
Error parameter effects may also be of interest if one believes that noise will decline as subjects
become experienced, and the purification of noise might provide a selection criterion (McKelvey
and Palfrey, 1998). The effects of changes in µ are generally not monotonic, since the whole p
e’
function in (2) is divided by µ, but the case when marginal payoffs are everywhere positive
(negative) can be handled (the proof is essentially the same as for Proposition 3).
Proposition 4 (Effects of a Decrease in the Error Parameter). Suppose that marginal expected
payoffs, p
e’(F, f, x), are everywhere positive (negative) for a symmetric game satisfying the local
payoff property. Then a decrease in µ yields stochastically higher (lower) logit equilibrium
decisions (in the sense of first-degree stochastic dominance) if p
e’(F, f, x) is either
a) decreasing in x, or
b) increasing in F.
This result is intuitive: when expected payoffs are increasing, so is the density determined by (1),
and an increase in noise "flattens" the density "pushing" mass to the left. Conversely, if the
expected payoff derivative is negative, the density is decreasing and an increase in noise pushes
mass to the right and causes a stochastic increase in the distribution of decisions.
14So far we have confined attention to games in which the payoff functions are symmetric
across the two firms. However, specific asymmetries are readily introduced. In particular,
suppose the functional forms of p1
e’(F2, f2, x, a1) and p2
e’(F1, f1, x, a2) are the same but a1 > a2.
Proposition 5 (Comparative Statics for Asymmetric Payoffs). Suppose that the shift parameter
increases marginal expected payoffs, i.e. ¶p
e’(F, f, x, a)/¶ai > 0, and let a2 > a1 in a game
satisfying the local payoff property. Then player 2’s logit equilibrium distribution of decisions
is stochastically higher than that of player 1, i.e. the distribution function for player 2 is lower
at each interior value of x, if p
e’(F, f, x, a) is either
a) decreasing in x, or
b) increasing in F.
The proofs in Appendix C are again lens proofs, horizontal for case (a) and vertical for
case (b). In a traveler’s dilemma game with individual-specific Ri parameters, this proposition
would imply that the person with higher penalty-reward parameter would have stochastically
lower claims.
Other Properties
For many applications, it is possible to show that the symmetric logit equilibrium density
function that solves (1) is single peaked. Since this proposition pertains to symmetric equilibria,
the player subscripts are dropped. The proof in Appendix D is based on assumed concavity-like
properties of expected payoff function, which ensure that expected payoffs are single peaked, and
hence that the exponential (or any other continuously increasing) functions of those expected
payoffs in (1) are single peaked. Of course, the "single peak" maximum may be at a boundary
point if the density is monotonic, as with the traveler’s dilemma for high R values in figure 1.
Proposition 6. (Single Peakedness) If the logit equilibrium a game satisfying the local payoff
property is symmetric and the expected payoff derivative, p
e’(F, f, x, a) is non-increasing in x
and strictly decreasing in the common F function, then the equilibrium density that solves (2) will
be single peaked.
15Even if the symmetric equilibrium is unique, there may exist asymmetric equilibria for
some games, e.g. those with asymmetric Nash equilibria. In experiments we often restrict
attention to symmetric equilibria when subjects are matched from single-population protocols and
have no way of coordinating on asymmetric equilibria (Harrison and Hirshleifer, 1989). In other
games it is possible to use properties the expected payoff function and its slope, p
e’(Fj, fj, x, a),
to prove that an equilibrium is necessarily symmetric. The symmetry result in Proposition 7,
which is stated and proved in Appendix D, is based on the assumption that p
e’(Fj, fj, x, a)i s
decreasing in Fj and non-increasing in x, as is the case in the traveler’s dilemma game.
IV. APPLICATIONS
The applications in this section include many types of games that are commonly used in
economics and other some other social sciences: coordination, public goods, bargaining, auctions,
and spatial location. The applications illustrate the usefulness of the theoretical propositions and
the contrasts between logit equilibrium analysis and the special case of a Nash equilibrium.
Example 2: Minimum-effort Coordination Game
Coordination games, which date back to Rousseau’s stag hunt problem, are second only
to social dilemma games in terms of interest to economists and social scientists. Coordination
games possess multiple Nash equilibrium, some of which are worse than others for all players,
which raises the issue of how a group of people (or even a whole economy) can become mired
in an inefficient equilibrium. First consider the minimum effort game described above, with a
payoff equal to the lowest effort minus the cost of a player’s own effort. Letting fj(x) and Fj(x)
denote the density and distribution functions associated with the other player’s decision, it is
straightforward to write player i’s expected payoff from choosing an effort level, x:











xf j( y )dy cx, i,j 1,2, j¹i,
player’s own effort, x, and the second term pertains to the case where the player’s own effort is
16the minimum. In order to work with the logit differential equation (2), consider the derivative
of this expected payoff with respect to x:
The intuition behind (8) is clear, since 1 - Fj(x) is the probability that the other’s effort is higher,
(8) p
e
i(x) 1 Fj(x) c, i, j 1,2, j¹i.
this is also the probability that an increase in effort will raise the minimum, but such an increase
will incur a cost of c. The expected payoff derivative in (8) is positive if Fj(x) = 0, and it is
negative if Fj(x)=1 ,s oany common effort is a pure-strategy Nash equilibrium, even though all
players prefer higher common efforts. Also, notice that the effort cost c determines the extent
of the asymmetry in loss incurred by deviating from any common effort.
Proposition 2(d) implies uniqueness, and the conditions of the comparative statics
Proposition 3 are also satisfied. Since p
e’ is decreasing in effort cost c, efforts are stochastically
lower in a minimum effort coordination game if the effort cost is increased, despite the fact that
changes in c to not alter the set of Nash equilibria as long as c < 1. Goeree and Holt (1999c)
report results for a two-person minimum effort experiment in which an increase in effort cost
from .25 to .75 lowered average efforts from 159 to 126. The logit predictions, based on an
estimated µ = 7.4, were 154 and 126 respectively. The estimated µ had a standard error of .3,
so the null hypothesis ofµ=0(Nash) can be rejected at any conventional level of significance.
Coordinating on high effort outcomes is far more difficult in experiments with larger
numbers of players, so consider the effect of having more than two players. With N-1 other
players, the increase in effort will only raise the minimum when all N-1 others are higher, so the
right side of (8) would become the product of all 1 - Fj(x) terms for the others, with the addition
of a term, - c, reflecting the cost effect as before. In a symmetric equilibrium, p
e’(x)=( 1-
F ( x ))
N-1 - c, which is decreasing in N, so an increase in the number of players will result in a
stochastic reduction in effort. Again, this intuitive result is notable since the set of Nash
equilibria is independent of N.
Example 3: The Median Effort and Other Order-Statistic Coordination Games
The minimum-effort game is only one of many types of coordination games. Consider
17a three-person, median-effort coordination game in which each player’s payoff is the median
effort minus the cost of their own effort. Instead of writing out the expected payoff function and
differentiating, the marginal expected payoff can be obtained directly since the marginal effect
of an effort increase is the probability that one’s effort is the median effort minus the effort cost:
The number 2 on the right side of (9) reflects the fact that there are two ways in which one
(9) p
e
i(x) 2F(x)(1 F(x)) c.
player can be below x and one can be above x, and each of these cases occurs with probability
F(x)(1-F(x)). A similar expression is obtained for an N-player game in which the payoff is the
kth order statistic minus the own effort cost. The marginal value of raising one’s effort is the
probability that an effort increase is relevant, which is the probability that k-1 others are above
x and N - k others below x. This probability again yields a formula for the marginal expected
payoff that is an Nth order polynomial in F, with a cost term, -c, attached. These intuitive
derivations of expected payoff derivatives are useful because they serve as a check on the
straightforward but tedious derivations based on differentiation.
These coordination games have the local payoff property, since the expected payoff
derivative depends only on powers of the cumulative distribution function. This ensures
existence of a symmetric equilibrium, and by Proposition 2(d), uniqueness. The expected payoff
derivative is non-increasing in x (holding F constant), so proposition 3(a) implies that the
common effort distribution is stochastically increasing in -c, or decreasing in c. This intuitive
effort-cost effect is supported by the data for 3-person median effort experiments in Goeree and
Holt (1999c), where average efforts in the final three periods decreased from 157 to 137 and
again to 113 as effort cost was raised from .1 to .4 and then to .6. There is a continuum of
asymmetric Nash equilibria in the median effort game (with the top two efforts being equal and
the lowest one at the lower bound), which do not explain these intuitive effort cost effects.
Example 4. Spatial Competition
The Hotelling model of spatial competition on a line has had wide applications in
industrial organization, and generalizations of this model constitute the most common application
18of game theory in political science. Suppose that voters are located uniformly on a line of unit
length in a single dimension (e.g. representing preferences on government spending). Two
candidates choose locations on the line, and voters vote for the candidate who is closest to their
preferred point on the line. If the two locations are x1 and x2, then the division point that
determines vote shares is the midpoint: (x1+x2)/2. The unique Nash equilibrium is for each to
locate at the midpoint of the line, which is an example of the "median voter theorem." To make
this model more interesting, lets assume that this is a primary, and that candidates incur a cost
in the general election when they move away from the extreme left point (0), since the extreme
left is the center of the general electorate for this party. Let this cost be denoted by cx, where
x is the distance from the left side of the line. We chose this example because the unique Nash
equilibrium is independent of c and remains at the midpoint as long as c < 1/2.
5
The logit equilibrium will be sensitive to the payoff asymmetries associated with the
location costs. To see this, let fj(x) denote the choice density for the other candidate, then the
expected vote share in the primary for location x is:










[(x y)/2 ] fj(y) dy cx,
integral represents the case where the other candidate is to the left, and the final term is the
location cost. In a symmetric equilibrium, the expected payoff derivative can be expressed:
The first term on the right side is the probability of having the "higher" x, times the -1/2 that is
(11) p
e
i(x) F(x)/2 (1 F(x))/2 f(x)(1 2x) c.
the marginal loss from moving to the right, i.e. away from the other candidate’s location. The
second term is the analogous share gain from moving to the right when this is in the direction
of the other candidate’s position. The third term represents the probability of a crossover,
5 To see this, note that the two locations should be adjacent in any Nash equilibrium, any adjacent locations away
from the midpoint would give the person with the smaller share an incentive to move a small distance to capture the larger
share. When c > 1/2, the unique Nash equilibrium is for both candidates to locate at the left boundary and share the vote.
19measured by the density f(x), times the effect of crossing over at x, i.e. of losing the vote share
x to the left and gaining the vote share 1 - x to the right, for a net effect of1-2 x .
Since f(x) determined by logit probabilistic choice rule in (1) will always be strictly
positive, it follows that the expected payoff derivative in (11) is strictly decreasing in x, holding
the other (F, f) arguments constant, so the uniqueness and comparative statics theorems apply.
It can be shown that the equilibrium density is symmetric around 1/2 if c = 0, and the implication
of Proposition 3 is that increases in c shift the densities the left.
6
Example 5. Bertrand Competition in a Procurement Auction
Consider a model in which N sellers choose bid prices simultaneously, and the contract
is awarded to the low-priced seller (ties occur with probability zero in a logit equilibrium with
a continuum of price choices). With zero costs, it is straightforward to express the expected
payoff for a bid of x in a symmetric equilibrium as: x(1 - F(x))
N-1, i.e. the price times the
probability that all others are higher. Differentiation yields:




N 1 x(N 1)(1 F(x))
N 2f(x),
(the others are higher), and the second term is the "cross-over" loss at x associated with the
chance of overbidding in a symmetric equilibrium. Since the expected payoff derivative is
decreasing in x, the symmetric equilibrium will be unique. The formula in (12) however is not
decreasing in N, and in fact, an increase in the number of bidders does not result in a stochastic
decrease in prices for any value of µ.
7 However, we have calculated the expected value of the
winning (low) bid for various values of µ that are in the range of µ values estimated from other
experiments. An increase in the number of bidders from 2 to 3 to 4 lowers the procurement cost
in this range, see Table I.
6 Goeree and Holt have also applied these techniques to the analysis of three-person location problems (work in
progress) to explain laboratory results that do not conform to Nash predictions.
7 This is because, for given N, the slope of the equilibrium density at the highest allowed bid must equal the slope
for the lowest allowed bid, which ensures that the distribution functions will cross.
20With an error parameter of about 8, the logit predicted minimum bids are close to those reported
Table I. Predicted Low Bids in Bertrand Game
N =2 N=3 N=4
µ = 1 9.6 7.4 6.5
µ = 5 23.7 16.9 13.9
µ=8 28.1 19.8 16.0
Laboratory Data
a 26.4 19.0 15.2
a Duwfenberg and Gneezy (1999)
by Dufwenberg and Gneezy (1998), and are inconsistent with the "Bertrand paradox" prediction
that price will be driven to marginal cost (zero in this case) even for the case of two sellers.
8
Morgan and Baye (1999) have also pointed out that prices above the Bertrand prediction can be
explained by a (power function) quantal response equilibrium.
Example 6. Imperfect Price Competition with Meet-or-Release Clauses
The Bertrand paradox has inspired a number of models that relax the assumption that the
firm with the low price makes all sales. Suppose that there is a number ai of loyal buyers who
purchase one unit from firm i. The remaining consumers, numbering b, purchase from the firm
with the lowest price. For simplicity, assume that a1 = a2 = a. Thus a represents the expected
sales of the firm with the high price, and b + a represents the low-price firm’s sales, which we
will normalize to 1. Loyalty has its limits, and therefore buyers have implicit or explicit "meet-
or-release" assurances that the high price firm must meet the lower price or allow the buyers to
switch. Since the market share is higher for the low-price firm, and since their final sales prices
are identical, the unique Bertrand/Nash equilibrium for a one-shot price competition game
involves lowering price to marginal cost, regardless of the size of a. Intuition and laboratory
evidence, however, suggests that price competition would be stiff for low values of a and that
8 A small discrepancy is that the average bids predicted by the logit equilibrium are slightly higher than those
reported by Duwfenberg and Gneezy (1999).
21prices would be much higher as the market share of the high-price firm approaches 1/2. This
intuition is again counter to the predictions of the unique Nash equilibrium. The expected payoff
consists of two terms, depending on whether or not the firm has the higher price and sells a,o r
has the lower price and sells a + b =1 :







yf j(y)dy x(1 Fj(x)),
This is non-increasing in x and increasing in a, so Proposition 3 ensures that prices will be
(14) p
e
i(x) (1 a)xf j(x) (1 Fj(x)).
stochastically increasing in a, which measures the sales of the high-price firm. In the Capra et
al. (1999b) experiments, prices were restricted to the interval [60, 160], and an increase in a
from .2 to .8 raised average prices from 69 to 129 in the final five periods. The unique Nash
prediction is 60 for both treatments, which contrasts with the logit predictions of 78 (±7) and 128
(±6) respectively, based on an error parameter estimated from a previous traveler’s dilemma
paper (Capra, et al. 1999a).
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Example 7. Capacity-Constrained Price Competition
Market power can arise when capacity constraints are introduced into the standard
Bertrand duopoly model of price competition. Suppose that demand is inelastic at K + Dr units
at any price below
− x, where K is the capacity of each firm and Dr is the residual demand obtained
by the high-price firm. In a symmetric equilibrium, the expected payoff for a price of x is [1-
F(x)]Kx + F(x)Dr x,s op
e ’=K-F ( x )(K - Dr)-f ( x )(K - Dr)x, which satisfies the assumptions of
Propositions 1 and 2, so the symmetric logit equilibrium exists and is unique. The implication
9 A new estimate of the error parameter for this imperfect price competition experiment yields µ = 6.7 with a
standard error of 0.5, which again allows rejection of the null hypothesis associated with the Nash equilibrium (no errors).
This estimated error parameter is quite close to the estimates of 7.4 for the minimum effort coordination game data
(Goeree and Holt, 1999c) and 8.5 for the traveler’s dilemma data (Capra et al., 1999a). These were repeated game
experiments with random matching; we have obtained higher error parameter estimates for games only played once.
22of Proposition 3 is that an increase in firms’ common capacity, K, will result in a stochastic
reduction in prices. This intuitive prediction is also a property of the mixed-strategy Nash
equilibrium obtained by equating expected profit to the safe earnings obtained by selling the
residual demand at the highest price: Dr
− x.
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Example 8. Public Goods
In a linear public goods game, each person makes a voluntary contribution, xi, and the
payoff depends on this contribution and on the sum of the others’ contributions:
where E is the endowment, RI is the "internal return" received from one’s own contribution, and
(15) pi(xi) E xi RI xi RE j¹i xj ,
RE is the "external return" received from the sum of others’ contributions. It is typically assumed
that RI < 1, so it is a dominant strategy not to contribute. The internal return may be greater than
the external return if one’s contribution is somehow located nearby, e.g. a flower garden will be
seen more by the owner than by those passing on the street. Notice that this is a trivial special
case of the rank-based payoffs in (5), since the payoffs do not depend on whether or not one’s
contribution is higher or lower than the others. In any case, the marginal expected return is a
constant, RI - 1, so uniqueness follows from Proposition 2(d). The constant marginal expected
payoff is non-increasing in x, so the comparative statics implications of Proposition 3 are that an
increase in the internal return will result in a stochastic increase in contributions, even though
full free riding is a dominant-strategy Nash equilibrium. Dozens of linear public goods
experiments have been conducted for the special case of (15) in which RI = RE, which is then
called the marginal per capita return (MPCR). The most salient result from this literature is the
positive MPCR effect (Ledyard, 1995), which is predicted by the logit equilibrium and not by
a Nash analysis.
Goeree, Holt, and Laury (1999) report experiments in which the internal and external
returns are varied independently, since only the internal return affects the cost of contributing,
10 It can be shown that the logit and Nash models have different qualitative predictions in an asymmetric capacity
model, since a firm’s logit price distribution will be sensitive to changes in its own capacity. In contrast, a change in one
firm’s capacity will only affect the other firm’s price distribution in a mixed equilibrium.
23whereas the external return may be relevant if one cares about other’s earnings. The strongest
treatment effect in the data was associated with the internal return, although contributions did
increase with increases in the external return as well. Econometric analysis of the data suggests
that the addition of an altruism factor to the basic preference structure explains the data well, and
the estimated error parameter is highly significant, allowing rejection of theµ=0null hypothesis.
Example 9: The Best-Shot Game
In the minimum-effort game, the common payoff factor is determined by the lowest effort,
or the "weakest link." The converse situation, which has been applied in some public goods
problems, is known as the "best-shot" game, where the maximum decision determines the
common payoff element (Harrison and Hirshleifer, 1989). Consider an asymmetric version where
the contribution costs may differ. The marginal expected payoff is the probability that one’s
decision is the relevant best shot, minus the cost of the payoff increase:




stochastically lower distribution of contributions, by Proposition 5. This intuitive "own-cost"
effect is not predicted in a Nash equilibrium. There are pure-strategy equilibria in which one
player contributes nothing and the other makes a full contribution. It can also be shown that
there is a mixed-strategy equilibrium, but it is a necessary property of a mixed equilibrium that
changes in one’s own payoff parameter do not affect one’s own mixed distribution, which must
remain fixed to keep the other player indifferent over the range of randomization.
The logit equilibrium for this game has a particularly interesting structure when c1 = c2
= 1/2, so that the logit differential equation, f¢ =( Ff - f/2)/µ, can be integrated to obtain:
This is the formula describing the progression of an epidemic, where F(x) represents the fraction
) )
f(x) f(0) (F(x) F(x)
2)/(2µ) f(0) F(x)(1 F(x))/(2µ).
of uninfected people at time x, so the rate of new infections, -f(x), is a linear function of
F(x)(1 - F(x)), which is the probability that an uninfected person meets an infected person. It
24is well known that this dynamic system traces out a logistic curve, and therefore, the logit
equilibrium will be a (truncated) logistic distribution.
Summary
Propositions 1 and 2 guarantee the existence of a unique, symmetric equilibrium for all
examples considered (including the symmetric version of the best-shot game). Moreover, all
examples satisfy the conditions of Proposition 3, so theoretical comparative statics results can be
determined, except the numbers effect in the Bertrand game, which we analyzed numerically.
There are laboratory experiments to evaluate the qualitative comparative statics predictions for
six of these games, as summarized in Table II. The left column shows the expected payoff
derivative, and the second column indicates the sign of the comparative statics effect associated
with each variable, where the + (or -) sign indicates that an increase in the exogenous variable
results in an increase (or decrease) in decisions in the sense of first-degree stochastic dominance.
The third column summarizes the directions of comparative statics effects reported in the
experiments cited in the footnotes. For comparison, the comparative statics properties of the
symmetric Nash equilibrium are listed in the right-hand column. In all cases, the reported effects
for laboratory experiments correspond to the logit equilibrium predictions. Most important, none
of the comparative statics effects listed are explained by the Nash equilibrium for that game.
This contrast is due to the fact that the shift variables listed in the table change the magnitudes
of payoff differences but not the signs, so the Nash equilibria are invariant to changes in these
variables.
V. Relationship with Other Approaches to Explaining Anomalies in Game Experiments
The noisy equilibrium models developed in this paper are complemented by noisy models
of learning, evolution, and adjustment. Learning models with probabilistic choices will be
responsive to asymmetries in the costs of directional adjustments, just as the logit equilibrium
will be sensitive to expected payoff asymmetries. These learning models include reinforcement
learning (Erev and Roth, 1995), where ratios of choice probabilities for two decisions depend on
ratios of the cumulated payoffs for those decisions. Even closer to the logit approach is the use
of fictitious play or other weighted frequencies of past observed decisions to construct "naive"
25beliefs, and thereby obtain expected payoffs that are filtered through a logit choice function (e.g.
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c Comparative statics based on numerical calculations; laboratory data from Dufwenberg and Gneezy (1998).
d Capra, et al. (1999b).
e Goeree, Holt, and Laury (1999).
Mookherjee and Sopher, 1997, and Fudenberg and Levine, 1998). Indeed, we have used these
methods to predict and explain the directional patterns of adjustment in the traveler’s dilemma,
imperfect price competition, and coordination games (Capra, et al., 1995a, 1995; Goeree and
Holt, 1999a). For example, a version of fictitious play with a single learning (forgetting)
parameter, together with a logit choice function, explains why average claims in Figure 1 fall
over time in the R = 50 treatment, stay the same in the R = 20 treatment, and rise in the R =1 0
treatment. Simulations using estimated learning and error parameters both track these patterns
in the traveler’s dilemma (Goeree and Holt, 1999a) and were used to predict the directions of
adjustment in the subsequent coordination and imperfect price competition experiments.
On the other hand, learning models that only specify partial or directional adjustments to
best responses to previously observed decisions need to be augmented with probabilistic choice,
since otherwise they are not sensitive to payoff asymmetries. For example, the best response to
26previous decisions in the traveler’s dilemma game is the other’s claim, independent of R, and the
best response in the minimum effort coordination game is the minimum of other’s efforts,
independent of effort cost, so directional best-response and partial adjustment models cannot
explain the strong treatment effect in these games unless payoff-based (e.g. logit) errors are
included.
Of course, learning models provide lower prediction errors since they use data up to round
t to predict behavior in round t + 1. Simulations of learning models are quite powerful prediction
tools, and we sometimes use them to predict dynamic data patterns for possible treatments before
we run them with human subjects (e.g. Capra, et al. 1999b). These learning and simulation
models and are complementary with equilibrium models, which predict steady state distributions
when learning slows down or stops, as in the last five periods in Figure 1. To summarize,
learning models are used to predict adjustment patterns and selection in the case of multiple
equilibria; whereas equilibrium models are used to predict the steady state distributions and how
they shift in response to changes in exogenous parameters.
A second approach to the analysis of behavioral anomalies involves relaxing the standard
preference assumptions. Positive contributions in public goods games, for example, are often
attributed in part to concerns about others’ payoffs. Lottery-choice anomalies have been
attributed to non-linear probability weighting. Overbidding relative to Nash predictions has been
attributed to risk aversion. In bargaining experiments, the tendency for inequitable offers to be
rejected has been attributed to inequity aversion. These generalized preference models will be
more convincing if the estimated parameters turn out to be somewhat stable across different
experiments, e.g. a risk aversion explanation of overbidding in private value auctions will be
more appealing if similar degrees of risk aversion are estimated from experiments with similar
payoff levels. Indeed, Bolton and Ockenfels (1999) and Fehr and Schmidt (1997) have developed
models with inequity aversion that are intended to explain behavior in a wide class of games and
markets.
Without any added noise, these preference-based theories will suffer from the same
problem that plagues the Nash equilibrium with perfect rationality, i.e. that choice tendencies
depend on the signs, not on the magnitudes, of payoff differences. For two players, for example,
the Fehr and Schmidt model replaces own payoffs, pi, with a function that depends on whether
27the other person has a higher or lower payoff, i.e. with pi - a(pj - pi)i f p j- p i> 0, and with
pi - b(pi - pj)i f p j- p i< 0. Here, the "envy" parameter, a, is greater than or equal to the
"guilt" parameter, b, which is assumed to be non-negative. Consider the application of this
model to the minimum effort game. A unilateral increase from any common effort will lower
own payoff due to the increased effort cost, and since the other’s payoff is not changed, this will
create an envy cost. Conversely, a unilateral decrease will decrease both players’ earnings, but
the decrease will save on own effort cost, which creates an additional loss due to the guilt effect.
Thus the effect of the envy and guilt parameters is to increase deviation losses in both directions,
so the set of equilibria is unchanged. As before, any common effort level is an equilibrium with
these generalized preferences, irrespective of the effort cost, so this model of inequity aversion
would not explain the strong (effort-cost) treatment effects observed in this game.
Fortunately, generalized preference models can be combined with logit and other
probabilistic choice models. Fairness and relative earnings considerations are salient in
bargaining. In our own work, inequity aversion explains the strong effects of asymmetric money
endowments on behavior in alternating offer games, where both the inequity and error parameters
estimated from laboratory data are highly significant (Goeree and Holt, 1999b). Similarly, we
have found that noise alone does not explain why bidders bid above the Nash equilibrium in
private value auctions, but a hybrid model yields highly significant error and risk aversion
estimates (Goeree, Holt, and Palfrey, 1999).
Finally, it is well known that subjects in experiments are sometimes subject to systematic
biases, and that complex problems may be dealt with by applying rules of thumb or heuristics.
In a common-value auction, for example, bidders fail to realize that having the high bid contains
unfavorable information about the unknown prize value, and overbidding with losses can occur.
When there is a single identifiable bias, it should be modeled, perhaps with probabilistic choice
appended. When there is not single source of error that can be feasibly modeled, the standard
practice is to put the un-modeled effects into the error term.
VI. Conclusion
The standard techniques for characterizing a Nash equilibrium are well developed and
understood, but the Nash concept fails to explain the most salient aspects of data from a wide
28array of laboratory experiments. For example, a decrease in the penalty rate in a traveler’s
dilemma does not alter the unique Nash prediction at the lowest claim, but successive reductions
in the penalty parameter move the distributions of observed claims progressively toward the
opposite end of the set of feasible decisions. Similarly, increases in effort cost sharply reduce
distributions of observed efforts in experiments, despite the fact that these cost reductions do not
alter the set of Nash equilibria, so again the most prominent feature of the data is not being
explained.
Anomalous experimental results are not damaging to the Nash paradigm if there is no
obvious alternative, but here we argue for an alternative approach is based on probabilistic choice
functions that introduce some "noise" that can represent either error and bounded rationality
(Rosenthal, 1989) or unobserved preference shocks (McKelvey and Palfrey, 1995). In interactive
games, even relatively small amounts of noise can have a snowball effect if deviations in the
"less risky" direction make further deviations in that direction more attractive. The logit
probabilistic choice function allows decision probabilities to be positively but not perfectly related
to expected payoffs, and the logit equilibrium incorporates the feedback effects of noisy behavior
by requiring belief distributions that determine expected payoffs to match logit choice
distributions for those expected payoffs.
The logit equilibrium is essentially a one-parameter generalization of Nash, obtained by
not requiring an error parameter to be exactly zero. Since the logit model nests the Nash model,
it is straightforward to evaluate them with maximum likelihood estimation based on laboratory
data. In fact, any econometric estimation requires some incorporation of random noise, and the
quantal response approach incorporates noise in a manner that is natural for interactive games,
since it allows error probabilities to be affected by the interaction of other players’ errors and
payoff effects.
The experience with generalized expected utility theory in the last fifteen years, however,
indicates that a generalized approach simply will not be used if it is too messy. The logit
analysis, at first glance, is messy; the equilibria are always probability distributions, which
complicates analysis of existence and uniqueness. Similarly, comparative statics results pertain
to relationships among distributions. In this paper, we provide a general existence result for
games with a continuum of decisions, and for auction-like games we show how symmetry,
29uniqueness, and comparative static results can be obtained from a series of related proofs by
contradiction, based on "lens" graphs. The theoretical propositions are then used to characterize
the comparative statics properties of the logit equilibria for a series of games. All of the logit
comparative statics results in Table II are as predicted, and none are explained by the relevant
Nash equilibrium. Although anomalous from a Nash perspective, these theoretical and
experimental results are particularly important because they are consistent with simple economic
intuition that deviations from best responses are more likely in the less risky direction.
30Appendix A: Proof of Proposition 1 (Existence of Equilibrium)
Unlike most of the other propositions in the paper, the existence result only requires that
expected payoffs are bounded and continuous in others’ distribution functions. The latter
condition certainly holds for the "local" payoff functions considered in this paper, but is true
more generally. We also generalize the logit rule by writing the choice density function as:










Note that boundedness of the expected payoff implies that (for µ > 0) there will be no mass
points, i.e. the equilibrium distribution functions will be continuous.
Proposition 1. (Existence) For all games in which players’ expected payoffs are bounded and
continuous in other’s distribution functions, there exists a symmetric logit equilibrium for N-
player games with a continuum of feasible decisions, and the equilibrium distribution is twice
differentiable.
Proof. Let F(x) denote the vector of choice distributions, whose i-th entry, Fi(x), is the
distribution of player i, for i = 1,...,n. Integrating the left and right-hand sides of (A1), yields an
operator T that maps a vector F(b) into a vector TF(b), with components:













all x Î [x,
− x], and i = 1,...,n. As noted above the equilibrium distributions are continuous, so
there is no loss of generality in restricting attention to C [x,
− x], the set of continuous functions
on [x,
− x]. In particular, consider the set: S º {F Î C [x,
− x] F £ 1}, where denotes the
sup norm. The set S, which includes all continuous cumulative distributions, is an infinite-
31dimensional unit ball, and is thus closed and convex. Hence, the n-fold (Cartesian) product
S
n = S × ... × S, is a closed and convex subset of C[x,
− x] × ... × C[x,
− x], the set of all continuous
n-vector valued functions on [x,
− x]. This latter space is endowed with the norm F n = max i=1..n
Fi . The operator T maps elements from S
n to itself, but since S
n is not compact, we cannot
rely on Brouwer’s fixed point theorem. Instead, we use the following fixed point theorem due
to Schauder (see for instance Griffel, 1985):
Schauder’s Second Theorem: If S
n is a closed convex subset of a normed space and H
n is
relatively compact subset of S
n, then every continuous mapping of S
n to H
n has a fixed point.
To apply the theorem, we need to prove: (i) that H
n º {TFF Î S
n } is relatively compact, and
(ii) that T is a continuous mapping from S
n to H
n. The proof of (i) requires showing that
elements of H
n are uniformly bounded and equicontinuous on [x,
− x]. From (A2) it is clear that
the mapping TFi(x) is non-decreasing. So TFi(x)£ TFi(
− x) = 1 for all x Î [x,
− x], Fi Î S, and
i = 1,...,n, and elements of H
n are uniformly bounded. To prove equicontinuity of H
n, we must
show that for every e > 0 there exists a d > 0 such that TFi(x1)-TFi(x2)< e whenever x1 -
x2< d, for all Fi Î S, i = 1,...,n. Consider the difference:













bound the right side of (A3) by:
Thus the difference in the values of TFi is ensured to be less than e for all Fi Î S, i = 1,...,n,
TFi(x1) TFi(x2) £
g(pmax) x1 x2
g(pmin)( x x )
.
by setting x1 -x2< d, where d = e (
− x - x) g(pmin)/g(pmax). Hence, TF is equicontinuous for all
F Î S
n.
32Finally, consider continuity of T. By assumption the expected payoffs are continuous in
others’ distributions and g is continuous, so g(pi
e(x)/µ) is continuous in the others’ distributions
and so are integrals of g(pi
e(x)/µ). And since g(pmin/µ) is bounded away from zero, so is the ratio
of integrals in (1). Hence T is a continuous mapping from S
n to H
n.
Differentiability of the logit equilibrium densities is established recursively. Since payoffs
are bounded, the logit density in (B1) is bounded, which implies that expected payoffs are
continuous in x. A player’s effort density is a continuous function of expected payoff, and hence
each density is a continuous in x. Therefore the distribution functions are continuous, and so are
the expected payoffs. The effort densities are differentiable transformations of expected payoffs,
and so these densities are also differentiable. Thus all vectors of densities get mapped into
vectors of differentiable densities, and any fixed point must be a vector of differentiable density
functions. Q.E.D.
Appendix B: Proof of Proposition 2, parts (c) and (d) (Uniqueness)
Proposition 2. Any symmetric logit equilibrium for a game satisfying the local payoff property
is unique if the expected marginal payoff, p
e’(F, f, x, a) is either: a) strictly decreasing in x, or
b) strictly increasing in the common distribution function F, or c) independent of x and strictly
decreasing in f, or d) a polynomial expression in F, with no terms involving f or x.
Proof of Parts (c) and (d). Case (c) is based on a transformation of variables that allows a more
direct application of the logit differential equation (2), since it will produce a graph in which the
transformed densities have slopes that are exactly equal to the p
e’/µ functions that are so central
in these arguments. Notice that raising the height of the horizontal slice in Figure 2 will alter
the slopes of the distribution functions at that height. Let y denote the height of the slice in
Figure 2, and let f
*(y) denote the density as a function of y. Thus we are considering the
transformed density, f
*(y) where F(x)=y , and therefore dx/dy =1 / f ( x ). To derive the slope of
the transformed density as a function of the height of the slice, note that df
*(y)/dy =
[df(x)/dx][dx/dy]=f ’(x)/f(x)=p
e’(x)/µ, where the final equality follows from the logit differential
equation (2). Thus when we graph the transformed density as a function of y, we get a function
33with a slope that equals the expected payoff derivative divided by µ. Suppose that there are two
Figure 4. A Configuration of Transformed Densities that Yields A Contradiction.
symmetric equilibrium distributions denoted by F1 and F2, with the transformed density f1
*(y)
being above f2
*(y) for low values of y, as shown on the left side of Figure 4. These densities
must cross, or the distribution functions will never come together, as they must at
− x, if not before.
In any neighborhood to the right of the crossing, it must be the case that f1
*(y)<f 2
*( y ). But since
p
e¢ is assumed to be independent of x and strictly decreasing in the density, p
e’(y, f1(x1), x1, a)>
p
e ’(y, f2(x2), x2, a), and therefore, the slope of f1
*(y) is greater than the slope of f2
*(y) at all points
where f1 is lower, i.e. to the right of the crossing, which is a contradiction.
Case (d) is based on a cone proof: If the p
e’ is a polynomial in F of the form: A +
BF + CF
2 + .., then when it is multiplied by f(x) in (2), we get an expression for f’(x) that can
be integrated directly to obtain:
Obviously, any solution to (B1) is determined by the initial condition, f(0). Suppose that there
(B1) f(x) f(0) AF(x) BF
2/2 CF(x)
3/3 ...
are two solutions, and without loss of generality, f1(0) > f2(0). The two distribution functions
must intersect at least once since they must intersect at the upper bound of the support, if not
before. Let x
* be the lowest intersection point. Then at any point where the distribution
functions cross, i.e. where F1(x
*)=F 2(x
*), it follows from (B1) that f1(x
*)-f 2(x
*)=f 1(0)-f2(0) > 0.
This contradicts the fact that F1(x) must cut F2(x) "from above" when they cross. Q.E.D.
34Appendix C: Comparative Statics Proofs
Proposition 3 (Comparative Statics for a Symmetric Equilibrium). Suppose that the shift
parameter increases marginal expected payoffs, i.e. ¶p
e’(F, f, x, a)/¶a > 0, for a symmetric game
satisfying the local payoff property. Then an increase in a yields stochastically higher logit
equilibrium decisions (in the sense of first-degree stochastic dominance) if either
a) ¶p
e’/¶x £ 0, or b) ¶p
e’/¶F ³ 0.
Proof. Suppose that a2 > a1, and let the corresponding symmetric equilibrium distributions be
denoted by F1(x) and F2(x). The proof requires showing that F2(x) dominates F1(x) in the sense
of first-degree stochastic dominance, i.e. that F1(x)>F 2 ( x ) for all interior x. Suppose, in
contradiction, that F1(x) is lower on some interval, as shown in Figure 2. First consider case (i).
Any region of divergence between the distribution functions will have a maximum horizontal
difference, as indicated by the horizontal dashed line at the height of F
*. As in the proof of
Proposition 3(a), the first and second order conditions for the distance to be maximized at height
F
* = F1(x1)=F 2( x 2) are that the slopes of the distribution functions be identical at F
*, i.e. f1(x1)
= f2(x2), and that f1´(x1) ³ f2´(x2). In order to obtain a contradiction, recall that the distribution
functions satisfy the differential equation (2), evaluated at the appropriate level of a:
Since F1(x1)=F 2( x 2) and f1(x1)=f 2( x 2), everything except for a1 and a2 and the arguments x1 and
(C1) µ fi(x) p
e (Fi , fi, x, ai) fi(x), i I, II.
x2 on the right sides of the equations in (C1) are identical, when these equations are evaluated
at x1 and x2 respectively. The assumption for Case (a), together with a2 > a1 and x2 < x1, implies
that f1´(x1)<f 2 ´(x2), which contradicts the second-order condition for the maximum horizontal
difference. Next consider Case (b), in which the payoff derivative is non-decreasing in the
distribution function. Any region of divergence between the distribution functions will have a
maximum vertical difference, as indicated by the vertical dashed line at x
* Figure 3, where the
two distributions for a2 > a1 are now denoted by F1 and F2. The first and second order
conditions for the distance to be maximized at height x
* are that the slopes of the distribution
functions be identical, i.e. f1(x
*)=f 2( x
*), and that f1´(x
*) ³ f2´(x
*). However, since p
e’(Fj, fj, x, aj)
35is increasing in Fj and F1(x
*)<F 2 ( x
* ) by assumption, it follows that
Then the logit differential equation in (2) implies that f1´(x
*)<f 2 ´(x
*), which yields the desired
contradiction. These arguments apply to the N player case, since by symmetry, the density and
distribution functions of all players are identical and have the same value at x
*. Q.E.D.
Proposition 5 (Comparative Statics for Asymmetric Payoffs). Suppose that the shift parameter
increases marginal expected payoffs, i.e. ¶p
e’(F, f, x, a)/¶ai > 0, and let a2 > a1 in a game
satisfying the local payoff property. Then player 2’s logit equilibrium distribution of decisions
is stochastically higher than that of player 1, i.e. the distribution function for player 2 is lower
at each interior value of x, if either: a) ¶p
e’/¶x £ 0, or b) ¶p
e’/¶F £ 0.
Proof. Suppose that a2 > a1, and let the corresponding equilibrium distributions be denoted by
F1(x) and F2(x) for players 1 and 2 respectively. We wish to show that F1(x)>F 2 ( x ) for all
interior x (i.e., F2(x) dominates F1(x) in the sense of first-degree stochastic dominance). Suppose
not, so that F1(x) is lower on some interval, as per Figure 3. As in the proofs of Proposition 1,
the first and second order conditions for the vertical distance F2(x)-F 1 ( x ) to be maximized at
action x
* imply that f1(x
*)=f 2 ( x
* ), and that f1´(x
*) ³ f2´(x
*). This in turn implies that we must
have p1
e’(F2, f2, x
*, a1) ³p 2
e ’(F1, f1, x
*, a2); but, since a2 > a1 and pi
e’ is increasing in a,i t
follows from the assumption in case (a) that this can only hold if F1(x
*)>F 2 ( x
* ), contradicting
the original condition. Case (b) is proved with a horizontal lens argument based on Figure 2.
This proposition also applies to the case of more than two players, since the effects of others’
densities and distributions affect both p1
e’(F2, f2, x
*, a1) ³p 2
e’(F1, f1, x
*, a2) in the same manner,
when evaluated at the same value of x. Q.E.D.
36Appendix D: Symmetry and Single Peakedness
Proposition 6. (Single Peakedness) If the logit equilibrium for a game satisfying the local payoff
property is symmetric and the expected payoff derivative, p
e’(F, f, x, a), non-increasing in x and
strictly decreasing in the common F function, then the equilibrium density that solves (2) will be
single peaked.
Proof. The assumptions, together with Proposition 7 below, imply that the equilibrium is
symmetric across players, so we will drop the player subscripts from the notation that follows.
Since the density in (1) is proportional to an exponential function of expected payoffs, we need
to show that the expected payoff function is concave in x. To do this, consider the second
derivative of expected payoff with respect to x, i.e. the derivative of p
e’(F(x), f(x), x, a) with
respect to x, taking into account the direct effects and the indirect effect through arguments in
the density and distribution functions. This derivative is:
The first and third terms on the right side of (D1) are negative by assumption, and the logit
(D1) dp
e /dx ¶p
e /¶F f(x) ¶p
e /¶f f (x) ¶p
e /¶x.
differential equation (2) implies that the second term is zero at any stationary point with p
e’=0 .
It follows that the right side of (D1) is negative at any stationary point of the expected payoff
function, and therefore, that any stationary point will be a local maximum. Q.E.D.
Proposition 7. (Symmetry) Any logit equilibrium for a game satisfying the local payoff property
is necessarily symmetric across players if the expected payoff derivative, p
e’(Fj,f j,x ,a ), is either
(a) strictly decreasing in the Fj functions for all other players, or (b) weakly decreasing in the
Fj and fj functions.
Proof. Case (a): First consider the case of two players and suppose, in contradiction, that their
equilibrium distributions are not the same. Without loss of generality, assume F1(x) is lower on
some interval, as shown in Figure 3. Any region of divergence between the distribution functions
will have a maximum vertical difference, as indicated by the vertical line at x
*. The first and
37second order conditions for the distance to be maximized at height x
* are that the slopes of the
distribution functions be identical, i.e. f1(x
*)=f 2( x
*), and that f1´(x
*) ³ f2´(x
*). However, since the
densities are equal at x
* and pi
e’(Fj, fj, x, a) is decreasing in the other player’s distribution, Fj,
it follows that
Then the logit differential equation in (2) implies that f1´(x
*)<f 2 ´(x
*), which yields the desired
(D2) p
e
1 (F2(x ), f2(x ),x ,a)<p
e
2( F 1( x), f1(x ), x , a).
contradiction. This proof generalizes to the N player case, since the others’ density and
distribution functions, evaluated at x
*, would have the same effect on both distribution functions.
Case (b): Consider the asymmetric configuration in Figure 3 again. Just to the right of
the left-side crossing of the distribution functions, there must be an interval where F2 > F1, and
f2 > f1. For any x in this interval, it follows from assumption (b) that p2
e’(F1(x), f1(x), x, a) ³
p1
e’(F2(x), f2(x), x, a), and hence that f2(x)p2
e’(F1(x), f1(x), x, a) ³ f1(x)p1
e’(F2(x), f2(x), x, a). But
this latter inequality is, by (2), a condition that f2’(x2)>f 1 ’(x1), so the horizontal distance
between F1 and F2 will never decrease, in contradiction of the fact that these distributions must
meet, at the uppermost value of x if not before. Q.E.D.
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